Previous application of cooperative game theory to household decision making resulted in few testable or refutable hypotheses concerning the actual behavior of the household. Those applications did point to new data requirements, namely, the need to measure the separate unearned incomes of individuals in a coalition and one could test hypotheses on household demand concerning these separate incomes. In addition, they indicated that the all-important substitution effects in a bargaining household need not behave in the same way as those effects in a neoclassical household. Hence, a bargaining household could be observed to be a neoclassical one so that it would be difficult to distinguish empirically between a household that behaves neoclassically and one that operates according to the Nash axioms (Pareto optimality, solutions that are invariants to positive linear transformations, symmetry, etc.) Moreover, those applications yielded no way to distinguish empirically between a symmetrical and a dictatorial household. Acceptance of the bargaining approach thus necessitated the derivation of hypotheses that could be refuted by observed data; in short, "to give some examples of empirical propositions that might emerge," as stated in the NIH Critique. That is what the enclosed paper begins to do.